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Margolis on Realism and Idealism
Sami Pihlström
1 Joseph Margolis has written on the problem of realism voluminously over several decades
– in addition to the enormous number of other philosophical debates he has contributed
to in original ways. His latest book, Pragmatism Ascendent,1 discusses a wide spectrum of
philosophical issues, including the transformations of transcendental philosophy today in
terms of (Hegelian) historicity and ‘flux,’ as well as the question of “what it is to be a
human self” (Margolis 2012: x), but once again the realism debate is one of the central
themes covered, to a large extent in relation to these other complex debates. In this brief
paper, I will examine Margolis’s arguments for the special kind of integration of realism
and idealism (or “Idealism,” as he prefers to write)2 in relation to his attempt to develop a
viable version of pragmatism conscious of its Kantian and especially Hegelian roots, yet
promising to develop the pragmatist tradition further in philosophy today.
⁂
2 Margolis’s overall argument is, as usual, complicated, and it would be impossible to even
try to summarize it here. One of his characterizations of what the book offers is this: “a
descendent3 strategy  argumentatively  (or  genealogically)  derived  from  the
transcendental  turn turned pragmatist  by refusing to concede any strong disjunction
between  broadly  ‘empirical’  first-order  inquiries  and  broadly  ‘rational’  second-order
speculations about the legitimacy of both the first and the second” (4). In this context of
inquiry, the realism issue is never the primary topic; it is commented on repeatedly as the
genealogical  and  quasi-transcendental  examinations  of  Hegel’s  response  to  Kant,  of
Peirce’s fallibilism, and of the inadequacies of  contemporary philosophy of mind and
social ontology unfold. These philosophical and metaphilosophical contexts turn out to
be relevant to the very special  – indeed highly unusual  – integration of  realism and
Idealism that Margolis proposes.
3 The first substantial comment on the realism issue in the volume is this, from the opening
of Chapter 1:
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The  viability  of  the  transcendental question  (apart  from  the  fortunes  of
transcendentalism)  makes no sense,  unless  we also concede that  the viability  of
empirical  realism  cannot  be  separated  from  “idealism”  (the  “Idealism”  already
implicated in the transcendental question itself): that consideration already signals
the  importance  of  deciding  whether  the  human version  of  “reason”  reflexively
affects what we affirm to be possible regarding “what there is” in the whole of
reality independent of human cognition. […] I take “realism” and “Idealism” to be
inseparable within any “constructivist”  form of realism – it  being the case that
there is no other viable form of realism. I take that to be both Hegel’s and Peirce’s
view. (8)
4 So realism is maintained: there is something that can be called ‘reality independent of
human cognition,’ and we can and do, quite legitimately, affirm things about ‘what there
is’  in  that  reality.  Yet  this  is  something  that  we  affirm,  or  fail  to  affirm,  and  the
transcendental question (that is, the second-order question concern legitimation itself),
as Margolis notes, reflexively addresses whether human reason – its structure, or perhaps
its  history  –  inevitably  affects  these  affirmations.  Thus,  realism,  when  considered
transcendentally, cannot be all-inclusive or full-blown. It must be restricted to a human
perspective available in a pragmatic analysis.
5 This  is  what  it  means  to  take  the  issue  of  realism not  just  metaphysically  but  also
epistemologically seriously: we need to construe a form of realism that we are able to ‘live
with’ within our always inevitably historically situated and finite inquiries, processes that
are  themselves  continuously  in  flux.  There  is  no  return  to  what  Kant  labeled
‘transcendental  realism’  (which,  notoriously,  conflates  appearances  with  things  in
themselves) or to what Hilary Putnam two centuries later famously called ‘metaphysical
realism’ (which postulates a ‘God’s-Eye View’ on the world). These appeals to an imagined
super-human  perspective  on  what  there  really  is  go  considerably  beyond  the  more
minimal realism that Margolis favors, a realism that accepts the idea that there is such a
reality independently of us but insists on there being only human views or perspectives –
no  divine  ones  –  on  that  reality.  Margolis  repeatedly  reminds  us  (e.g.,  30)  that  we
construct our “pictures” of reality, but not reality itself, even when the inseparability of
realism and Idealism is recognized.
6 Constructivism, for Margolis, is fully compatible with realism and does not entail any
“ontic  construction of  the whole of  ‘reality’  itself”  (39).  Accordingly,  while  what  we,
within Idealism,  may find ‘determinately real’  presupposes ‘the ability of  a  cognitive
agent to discern the fact,’ this by no means requires the real world to be constructed by
such agents; again, ‘what is constructed is one or another picture of the world’ (59-60) –
presumably including, reflexively, this very picture of realism itself. Charles S. Peirce’s
realism, in particular, is a “constructivist posit supported in terms of what we rationally
Hope holds true at the end of infinite inquiry” (60). This is – and here Peirce’s special kind
of fallibilism truly comes into the picture – because realism cannot be a “free-standing
epistemological  option,”  if  inquiries  “must  be  infinitely  extended”;  rather,  realism
requires (possibly a naturalized version of) an “Idealist supplement” (73).
7 Given his Peircean elaborations, it is easy to see that Margolis’s realism is not just the
minimal affirmation that there is something we never constructed. It is a significantly
richer position, accommodating an acknowledgment of realism itself being a distinctively
human conception of reality. Our realism itself is a ‘human face’ that the world, as seen
from our human perspective, has.4 Realism, as Margolis has put it is several previous
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publications, is a human ‘posit’ rather than the world’s ‘own’ picture of itself. It is not
Nature’s ‘own’ image of itself but our image of the world, natural and historic-cultural.5
⁂
8 How  is  this  view  on  realism  and  Idealism  related  to  pragmatism,  and  the  historical
developments that led to the emergence (and the current re-emergence) of pragmatism?
Margolis links these processes of development with Peirce’s peculiar fallibilism, which
along with “the inseparability of realism and Idealism” is one of the defining features of
“the sense in which pragmatism […] cannot fail  to be construed as an ingenious and
especially  promising spare variant  of  Hegel’s  own undertaking,  now naturalized […]”
(10). Hegel, then, is Margolis’s historical hero – not Kant, even though Kant was the first
to insist on the compatibility of realism and idealism (or, more specifically, empirical
realism and  transcendental  idealism).  Indeed,  Kant’s  account  of  empirical  realism is
claimed to  be  “completely  subjectivist”  and incoherent  by  Hegelian lights  (10);  Kant
cannot  “recover  any robust  form of  empirical  realism” (20).  The proper  recovery of
realism then eventually takes place, after Hegel, in Peirce; indeed, Peirce and Hegel form
the pair of philosophical heroes that Margolis celebrates throughout the book.
9 It  is  understandable that Margolis  emphasizes Hegel’s  role as a background figure of
pragmatism in contrast to Kant’s. The latter has been emphasized by other pragmatism
scholars  (including the present  author),  and Hegel  has  often been unduly  neglected.
Margolis’s criticism of Kant’s arguments for transcendental idealism could be compared
to Kenneth Westphal’s, who also suggests that Hegel was the first “pragmatic realist.”6
Westphal could, I believe, easily join Margolis in acknowledging that “objectivity becomes
historicized and constructivist” in a pragmatist reinterpretation (or, as Margolis says,
“fragmentation”) of Hegel’s “recovery of realism” (21) and that Hegel’s critique of Kant
leads to a robust realism about the objects of experience.
10 Given that this narrative plays a very important role in Margolis’s overall argument, it
might have been appropriate for him to acknowledge Westphal’s work, both his careful
historical examinations of both Kant’s and Hegel’s arguments and his more systematic
efforts to show both that Kantian transcendental idealism is not a viable option – neither
for Kant himself, given his anti-Cartesian and fallibilist approaches, nor for us – and that
the realist can nevertheless argue transcendentally (yet fallibly). The reader familiar with
Westphal’s ideas would find a comparison highly valuable.
⁂
11 While the key figure of Margolis’s first chapter is Hegel, the central philosopher of the
second one is Peirce. Margolis there argues that Peirce develops further the Hegelian
unity of realism and Idealism – to the extent that it would be wrong to say that Peirce was
a realist and an Idealist (54). He is both but not in the disjunctive sense these doctrines are
traditionally understood in relation to each other. On Margolis’s reading, Peirce “believed
that  it  was only within the terms of  his  Idealism that  the realist  thesis  would prove
compelling at all” and therefore “saw no viable disjunction in pressing the realism of
science and the need for an Idealist metaphysics” (54). Or, more precisely, Peirce was “not
a  realist  and also,  independently,  an  Idealist”  (55);  these  two  doctrines  could  not
coherently be maintained independently according to him (or so Margolis urges).7 What
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Peirce uniquely developed, in a post-Hegelian environment, is a constructivist (Idealist)
version of scientific realism.
12 By  emphasizing  the  inseparability  of  realism  and  Idealism,  or  the  inevitable
embeddedness  of  realism in  constructivism,  in  Peirce,  Margolis  insightfully  criticizes
some of the leading more strongly realist interpreters of Peirce, all the way from Max
Fisch to Cheryl Misak and others.8 He also suggests – as he has done on a number of
earlier occasions – that Peirce’s scholastic realism about the reality of ‘generals’ should be
replaced by a constructivist account of “predicable ‘generals’” (76).9 Such generals, in a
way,  are  not  independent  of  human  thought  (78)  –  though  again  I  would  rather
emphasize their transcendental dependence and, correspondingly, empirical independence.
13 Margolis recognizes very important similarities in Peirce’s and Dewey’s fallibilisms and
their versions of the union of realism and Idealism, which, in Dewey, is more explicitly
naturalized and evolutionarily laid out. Where Margolis in my view goes wrong is in his
neglect of William James. He claims that James was “little more than a secondary figure”
in comparison to the two other great classical pragmatists (86) and speaks about the
“damage  of  James’s  well-known,  attractive  informality”  (90)  and  even  about  his
“disastrous” conception of truth (92). Even though he may be right to point out that the
realization that the Peircean notion of what is “independent of the vagaries of you and
me” is itself constructed by pragmatist means does not validate James’s account of truth
as  such  (106),  he  unfortunately  seems  to  ignore  James’s  independent  role  in  the
development of the pragmatic method – and in the pragmatist articulation of the realism
issue in terms of that method, which in effect makes ontology dependent on, or entangled
with, ethics.10
⁂
14 Occasionally – to go backwards in the historical story Margolis is telling us – it also seems
to  this  reader  at  least  that  Margolis  fails  to  do  full  justice  to  Kant’s  transcendental
considerations.  For  example,  though I  very much appreciate Margolis’s  Hegelian and
Peircean project of ‘pragmatizing’ and historicizing Kant, I remain unconvinced by the
criticism that Kant does not introduce “a working distinction between appearances and
the objects they are appearances of” (19). A ‘one world’ Kantian response to this charge is
obviously that appearances are appearances of things in themselves; these are not two
different classes of objects (as more traditional ‘two worlds’ interpretations maintain)
but, rather, the ‘same’ objects considered from two different perspectives, or articulated
through two different considerations.11 Moreover, Margolis does not pay due attention to
the distinction between the quite different empirical and transcendental ways in which,
say, space and time can be said to be ‘in us’  (29). He partly relies on P. F. Strawson’s
relatively conventional interpretation which has been heavily criticized by several ‘one
world’ Kantians. Margolis thus claims repeatedly that Kant’s transcendental question is
incoherent from the very start, but he never (as far as I can see) explains in any great
detail, or in full communication with relevant recent scholarship, why this is so. This is a
serious setback in his otherwise admirable treatment of the realism issue.
15 The story of the development of pragmatism can, it seems to me, be told by starting from
Kant – and partly skipping Hegel – just as it can be told (and is generally compellingly
told by Margolis) by beginning from Hegel’s historicization of Kant. Such a story, even
when it remains more Kantian than Hegelian, may also join Margolis in rejecting any
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“principled disjunction between the empirical and the transcendental” (30).12 In brief, I
remain somewhat unconvinced by Margolis about the idea that it is only Hegel, not Kant,
who offers a compelling version of the inseparability of realism and Idealism. Kant rejects
such an exclusive disjunction as firmly as Hegel.
16 Margolis is in fact relatively modest when insisting on the possibility of preserving the
distinction  between  metaphysical  and  epistemological  questions  even  given  the
“constructivist”  character  of  his  realism.  He could have gone further  by saying that
inasmuch  as  realism  itself  is  inevitably  constructivist  (pragmatic),  all  metaphysical
questions  about  the  way  the  world  is  are  inevitably  also  epistemological,  or  invoke
epistemological positioning. This would yield a more radical pragmatism. In fact such an
entanglement  of  the  metaphysical  and the  epistemological  would  have  been a  more
Kantian  position  and would  come  closer  to  a  Kantian-cum-pragmatist  (instead  of
Hegelian-cum-Peircean) naturalization of transcendental philosophy.
17 Next, take a look at this:
Kant defeats the realist metaphysics of the rationalists all right; but, then, he also
obliges the “objectivity” of science and metaphysics to depend on transcendental
(subjective) sources and, in doing that, he makes “empirical realism” no more than
an artefact  of  those  same subjective sources:  accordingly,  he  cannot separate,  as
Hegel can, epistemological and metaphysical constructivism. (39)
18 But isn’t Margolis in his own way doing more or less the same when making realism
constructivist?  Epistemological  and  metaphysical  versions  of  constructivism  may
themselves be claimed to be entangled, necessarily, in a (Kantian) transcendental sense,
while of course being disentangled at the empirical level. (We do not construct the world
in any empirical, factual, or concrete sense – here I of course agree with Margolis. But it
does not follow that the concept of construction fails to do important transcendental
work that is not just epistemological but also, albeit in a qualified sense, metaphysical.)
Similarly,  the  claim  that  Kant’s  objects  are  mere  “internal  accusatives  of  subjective
experience itself” (40) is misleading, because, again, we can endorse a one world reading
(à  la  Allison  and  others)  and  view  empirical  objects  and  things  in  themselves  as
(ontologically) identical and only methodologically distinguishable.
19 Therefore,  when Margolis  writes  that  (once again)  Peircean “Idealism” is  “construed
‘epistemologically’  (in  the  constructivist  way)  rather  than  ‘metaphysically’
(disjunctively)” and is thus restricted to “our constructed picture” of reality rather than
the “actual ‘constitution’ of reality itself” (91), one might ask whether he isn’t himself
resorting to new versions of dichotomies or disjunctions he wants to set aside. Instead of
the realism vs. Idealism dichotomy, we now have (still) the one between metaphysics and
epistemology, and also the corresponding one between our picture of reality and reality
in itself. Note that these dichotomies – or, to be fair, more absolute versions of them – are
standardly  used in  the  kind of  mainstream analytic  philosophy that  Margolis  wisely
wants to leave behind. In my view, all these dualisms should be critically examined in
terms  of  the  pragmatic method  and  thereby  aufgehoben  as  versions  of  the  age-old
subjective vs. objective disjunction to be given up (at least in its conventional versions) in
any viable post-Kantian (and post-Hegelian) pragmatism.
20 Yet, my proposed re-entanglement of the metaphysical and the epistemological at the
transcendental level – the level at which constructivism provides a framework for any
viable  realism  –  must  somehow  also  accommodate  the  (re-)entanglement  of  the
transcendental and the empirical. Here I see the real challenge for the current pragmatist
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who wishes to develop further the insights of naturalized transcendental philosophy and
apply them to the realism debate. However that challenge can be met, the pragmatist can
certainly agree with Margolis’s ‘précis’:
We must, as realists, replace representationalism with some form of constructivism;
[…] we must, again as realists, avoid characterizing reality as itself constructed […]
and hold instead that what we construct are only conceptual “pictures” of what we
take the real world to be […]; and […] we must acknowledge that the realism thus
achieved is itself  cognitively dependent on, and embedded in, our constructivist
interventions. (55)
21 This can, I think, be offered as a useful characterization of the program of pragmatic
realism, insofar as we are able to give up Margolis’s in my view too sharp distinction
between (the construction of) reality itself and our pictures of it.  When developed in
Margolis’s  way,  pragmatic  (constructivist)  realism is  reflexively  conscious  of  its  own
status as a human pragmatic posit rather than an imagined God’s-Eye View picture of
how things absolutely are. Ironically, Margolis notes, “Peirce’s most strenuous insistence
on reality’s being independent of belief […] is,  contrary to what he actually says, not
‘independent  of  what  anybody  may  think  them  to  be’”  (85).  For  the  reflexively
sophisticated pragmatist, the real is indeed independent of what anyone of us thinks, but
this  independence  is  always  inevitably  affirmed  within  and  on  the  basis  of  human
thought.
⁂
22 Even if I mildly disagree, in the manner explained above, with Margolis on Kant’s place in
the story of pragmatism that needs to be told, and in the ways in which the story could
continue into the future,  I  warmly agree with him on the deep integration,  or  even
inseparability, of realism and Idealism – and even Idealism and naturalism, because these
need not be any more incompatible than realism and Idealism in Margolis’s Hegelian
pragmatism.  I  would  again  simply  prefer  to  rephrase this  in  Kantian transcendental
terms. I also agree that this transcendental approach itself, though naturalized within
pragmatism,  precludes  any  reductive  naturalism  or  eliminativism,  which  in  a  sense
presuppose the God’s-Eye View that only stronger forms of realism (avoiding any link to
any form of idealism) try to help themselves to. Margolis’s criticism of Wilfrid Sellars is
relevant here: the scientific image, he says, “is itself a proposal advanced by the same
intelligence  that,  on  his  [Sellars’s]  own  argument,  congenially  offers  the  ‘manifest
image’”  (26).13 Similarly,  I  agree  with  Margolis  on the  need to  develop a  truly  non-
reductive philosophical anthropology of the human self (or person), which is something
very different from what is done within in mainstream philosophy of mind today – a field
of philosophy that has for a long time just ignored pragmatism. Moreover, perhaps one of
Margolis’s most genuinely innovative ideas is the link he builds between the two post-
Hegelian and post-Darwinian topics he elaborates throughout the book, “the historicity of
the human world and the artifactuality of the self” (51).
23 There would be much more to say – about the artifactual self, its cultural emergence,
intentionality (or, again, ‘Intentionality,’ as Margolis prefers; see, e.g., 143),14 the relations
between the  natural  and  the  human sciences,  and  many other  topics,  including  the
endlessly disputable interpretations of  philosophers such as the classical  pragmatists,
Ernst Cassirer, and John Searle (all of whom Margolis discusses in some detail). Clearly,
(re)connecting all this with the realism issue, the main topic of this paper, would lead us
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too far. In any event, Margolis’s book, once again, offers plenty of food for philosophical
thought  on  fundamental  issues  that  are  with  us  to  stay,  whether  one’s  interests  lie
primarily in realism, philosophy of science, or philosophical anthropology.
24 Admittedly,  what  Margolis  has  provided us  with by  publishing this  new book is  yet
another relatively general and wide-ranging survey of the field of philosophy and the
prospects of pragmatism in the field quite generally,  instead of any fully worked-out
detailed theory of any specific issue (even realism and Idealism). Even so, his discussion
does include a number of  highly illuminating new formulations of  age-old problems,
historical and systematic, as well as new ways of understanding how those problems and
some of the proposed answers to them have been, and are, made possible. The historically
sensitive pragmatist – and any pragmatist interested in philosophy’s future should be
historically sensitive – should take Margolis’s reflections seriously, both regarding the
realism debate and more generally.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
ALLISON H. E., (2004), Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense – A Revised and
Enlarged Edition, New Haven, NH, Yale University Press, 2nd ed. (1st ed., 1983).
MARGOLIS J., (1984), Culture and Cultural Entities, Dordrecht, D. Reidel.
MARGOLIS J., (1986), Pragmatism without Foundations, Oxford, Blackwell.
MARGOLIS J., (1995), Historied Thought, Constructed World, Berkeley, CA, University of California
Press.
MARGOLIS J., (2010), Pragmatism’s Advantage, Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA.
MARGOLIS J., (2012), Pragmatism Ascendent: A Yard of Narrative, A Touch of Prophecy, Stanford, CA,
Stanford University Press.
PIHLSTRÖM S., (2003), Naturalizing the Transcendental: A Pragmatic View, Amherst, NY, Prometheus/
Humanity Books.
PIHLSTRÖM S., (2009), Pragmatist Metaphysics: An Essay on the Ethical Grounds of Metaphysics, London,
Continuum.
PUTNAM H., (1990), Realism with a Human Face, ed. J. Conant, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University
Press.
WESTPHAL K. R., (2004), Kant’s Transcendental Proof of Realism, Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press.
NOTES
1. The unspecified page references in the text are to this book (Margolis 2012).
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2. I will continue to write ‘Idealism’ when referring to the kind of idealism Margolis subscribes to
(and finds compatible  with realism).  This  must  be distinguished from some more traditional
idealisms that are contrasted with realism. The difference between the two doctrines (or sets of
doctrines)  is  that  ‘idealism’  is  “either  independent  of  or  neutral  with  regard  to  ‘realism’  or
disjunctively  opposed  to  ‘realism’,”  while  ‘Idealism’  with  a  capital  ‘I’  is  “hospitable  to
incorporating some forms of constructive ‘realism’” (91).
3. The book title, however, suggests an ascendence of pragmatism (!). Presumably, we are being
told  that  ascendence  and  descendence  are  not  incompatible  and  may  both  be  needed  as
philosophical strategies.
4. Compare this to Hilary Putnam’s notion of realism with a human face as developed in Putnam
1990.
5. Margolis’s other relevant discussions of realism include, e.g., Margolis 1986 and 1995.
6. See, e.g., Westphal 2004.
7. He also points out that “Peirce’s fallibilism is meant to explain just why we cannot, post-Kant
and post-Hegel,  fall back again to any separate realism or Idealism” – and that John Dewey’s
version of fallibilism in a way inherits this feature from Peirce’s (67), even though the realism/
Idealism issue is only marginally present in Dewey in comparison to Peirce (69-70).
8. He remarks, also, that “most of those who have followed Max Fisch’s reading of Peirce are also
committed to what Putnam opposes as the ‘God’s-Eye view’” (170, n26.). This relation between
the two slightly different realism disputes would deserve more historical scrutiny.
9. For  my own earlier  reflections on  Peircean  realism about  generality,  already  inspired  by
Margolis’s constructivist and historicist account of predicable generals, see Pihlström (2003: ch.
3) and (2009: ch. 6).
10. This is what I argue in Pihlström 2009.
11. Allison 2004.
12. This is what I try to do in Pihlström 2003. Margolis briefly comments on my effort in his
previous book (Margolis 2010).
13. In relation to his criticism of reductive naturalism – also a theme to which he seems to return
again and again – Margolis emphasizes yet another inseparability, that of the natural and the
human sciences (Ch. 3, 22). Both are human attempts to inquire into the world whose character
we constructively posit.
14. According  to  Margolis’s  characterization  here,  “whatever  is  culturally  significant  or
significative is  inherently Intentional”  (Ch.  3,  46).  For Margolis’s  previous discussions of  this
topic, see, e.g., his 1984 and 1995.
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